Service Binary in User Controlled Folder

SIGMA detection rule by Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) · GPL-2.0

Detects the setting of the "ImagePath" value of a service registry key to a path controlled by a non-administrator user such as "\AppData\" or "\ProgramData\". Attackers often use such directories for staging purposes. This rule might also trigger on badly written software, where if an attacker controls an auto starting service, they might achieve persistence or privilege escalation. Note that while ProgramData is a user controlled folder, software might apply strict ACLs which makes them only accessible to admin users. Remove such folders via filters if you experience a lot of noise.

title: Service Binary in User Controlled Folder
id: f9252ab9-0f85-c10d-fd51-576b83182926
related:
    - id: c625c4c2-515d-407f-8bb6-456f65955669
      type: obsolete
    - id: 277dc340-0540-42e7-8efb-5ff460045e07
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the setting of the "ImagePath" value of a service registry key to a path controlled by a non-administrator user such as "\AppData\" or "\ProgramData\".
    Attackers often use such directories for staging purposes.
    This rule might also trigger on badly written software, where if an attacker controls an auto starting service, they might achieve persistence or privilege escalation.
    Note that while ProgramData is a user controlled folder, software might apply strict ACLs which makes them only accessible to admin users. Remove such folders via filters if you experience a lot of noise.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-05-02
modified: 2024-03-25
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1112
    - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
    category: registry_set
    product: windows
detection:
    registry_set:
        EventID: 4657
        Channel: Security
    selection:
        ObjectName|contains|all:
            - ControlSet
            - \Services\
        ObjectName|endswith: \ImagePath
        NewValue|contains:
            - :\ProgramData\
            - \AppData\Local\
            - \AppData\Roaming\
    filter_optional_zoom:
        ObjectName|contains: \Services\ZoomCptService
        NewValue|contains: C:\Program Files\Common Files\Zoom\Support\CptService.exe
    filter_optional_mbami:
        ObjectName|contains: \Services\MBAMInstallerService
        NewValue|contains|all:
            - C:\Users\
            - AppData\Local\Temp\MBAMInstallerService.exe
    filter_main_windefend:
        ObjectName|contains:
            - \Services\WinDefend\
            - \Services\MpKs
        NewValue|contains: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\
    condition: registry_set and (selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*)
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium
ruletype: Sigma

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