Registry Manipulation via WMI Stdregprov

SIGMA detection rule by Daniel Koifman (KoifSec) · GPL-2.0

Detects the usage of wmic.exe to manipulate Windows registry via the WMI StdRegProv class. This behaviour could be potentially suspicious because it uses an alternative method to modify registry keys instead of legitimate registry tools like reg.exe or regedit.exe. Attackers specifically choose this technique to evade detection and bypass security monitoring focused on traditional registry modification commands.

title: Registry Manipulation via WMI Stdregprov
id: 287709ae-0175-f8df-11fc-9ec74c46d8c9
related:
    - id: c453ab7a-1f5c-4716-a3b4-dea8135fb43a
      type: derived
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the usage of wmic.exe to manipulate Windows registry via the WMI StdRegProv class.
    This behaviour could be potentially suspicious because it uses an alternative method to modify registry keys instead of legitimate registry tools like reg.exe or regedit.exe.
    Attackers specifically choose this technique to evade detection and bypass security monitoring focused on traditional registry modification commands.
references:
    - https://www.bitdefender.com/en-us/blog/businessinsights/shrinklocker-decryptor-from-friend-to-foe-and-back-again
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/command-line-underdog-wmic-in-action
    - https://trustedsec.com/blog/wmi-for-script-kiddies
author: Daniel Koifman (KoifSec)
date: 2025-07-30
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.discovery
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1047
    - attack.t1112
    - attack.t1012
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    process_creation:
        EventID: 4688
        Channel: Security
    selection_img:   # Example command simulated:  WMIC  /NameSpace:\\root\default Class StdRegProv Call CreateKey sSubKeyName=""SOFTWARE\Policies\DeleteMe""
        - NewProcessName|endswith: \wmic.exe
        - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe
    selection_cli:
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - call
            - stdregprov
    condition: process_creation and (all of selection_*)
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate administrative activity
level: medium
ruletype: Sigma

[[ currentRule.title && currentRule.title.length > 60 ? currentRule.title.slice(0, 60) + '…' : currentRule.title ]]

1d854e4d-3da7-4894-9bde-2bc4261e48c7

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Executable code, not a declarative rule

This submission is arbitrary [[ currentRule.format ? currentRule.format.toUpperCase() : '' ]] code, not a declarative detection rule — review it as you would any script before running it, and note that it cannot be safely aggregated or auto-executed alongside YARA/Sigma/Suricata/CRS rules.

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