Local Account Discovery with Net

SPLUNK detection rule by Mauricio Velazco, Splunk · Apache-2.0

The following analytic has been deprecated. The following analytic detects the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments `user` or `users` to query local user accounts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate local users, which is a common step in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further attacks, including privilege escalation and lateral movement within the network.

name: Local Account Discovery with Net
id: 5d0d4830-0133-11ec-bae3-acde48001122
version: 7
creation_date: '2021-08-24'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: removed
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic has been deprecated. The following analytic detects the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments `user` or `users` to query local user accounts. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate local users, which is a common step in situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further attacks, including privilege escalation and lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_net` (Processes.process=*user OR Processes.process=*users) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `local_account_discovery_with_net_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Administrators or power users may use this command for troubleshooting.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/001/
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Active Directory Discovery
        - Sandworm Tools
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1087.001
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
          - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1087.001/AD_discovery/windows-sysmon.log
            source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
            sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
deprecation_info:
    reason: Renamed and updated logic
    removed_in_version: 5.2.0
    replacement_content:
        - Windows User Discovery Via Net

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