Extraction of Registry Hives

SPLUNK detection rule by Michael Haag, Splunk · Apache-2.0

The following analytic has been deprecated. The following analytic detects the use of `reg.exe` to export Windows Registry hives, which may contain sensitive credentials. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving `save` or `export` actions targeting the `sam`, `system`, or `security` hives. This activity is significant as it indicates potential offline credential access attacks, often executed from untrusted processes or scripts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to credential data, enabling further compromise and lateral movement within the network.

name: Extraction of Registry Hives
id: 8bbb7d58-b360-11eb-ba21-acde48001122
version: 8
creation_date: '2022-11-16'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: removed
type: TTP
description: The following analytic has been deprecated. The following analytic detects the use of `reg.exe` to export Windows Registry hives, which may contain sensitive credentials. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving `save` or `export` actions targeting the `sam`, `system`, or `security` hives. This activity is significant as it indicates potential offline credential access attacks, often executed from untrusted processes or scripts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain access to credential data, enabling further compromise and lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process="*\sam *" OR Processes.process="*\system *" OR Processes.process="*\security *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md
    - https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/24/2003229517/-1/-1/0/CSA_Living_off_the_Land.PDF
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
    message: Suspicious use of `reg.exe` exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$
    risk_objects:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 56
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 56
    threat_objects:
        - field: parent_process_name
          type: parent_process_name
tags:
    analytic_story:
        - Volt Typhoon
        - Credential Dumping
        - CISA AA23-347A
        - DarkSide Ransomware
        - CISA AA22-257A
    asset_type: Endpoint
    mitre_attack_id:
        - T1003.002
    product:
        - Splunk Enterprise
        - Splunk Enterprise Security
        - Splunk Cloud
    security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
          - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.002/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
            source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
            sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
deprecation_info:
    reason: Renamed and updated logic
    removed_in_version: 5.2.0
    replacement_content:
        - Windows Sensitive Registry Hive Dump Via CommandLine

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