Cisco IOS XE VTY Access Class Tampering

SPLUNK detection rule by Nasreddine Bencherchali · Apache-2.0

This analytic detects rapid modification of Cisco IOS-XE VTY access-class settings. The Salt Typhoon notes describe configure HTTP activity followed by line vty changes and removal/re-application of an access-class within 60 seconds.

name: Cisco IOS XE VTY Access Class Tampering
id: a01ca274-16cb-476d-a814-d2ffe29d8905
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-05-19'
modification_date: '2026-05-20'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |
    This analytic detects rapid modification of Cisco IOS-XE VTY access-class settings. The Salt Typhoon notes describe configure HTTP activity followed by line vty changes and removal/re-application of an access-class within 60 seconds.
data_source:
    - Cisco IOS Logs
search: |-
    `cisco_ios`
    facility IN ("HA_EM", "PARSER")
    mnemonic IN ("LOG", "CFGLOG_LOGGEDCMD")
    message_text IN (
        "*access-class*",
        "*configure http*",
        "*line vty*"
    )
    | rex field=message_text "^(?:[^:]+:\s+)?(?:catchall:\s+)?(?<eem_command>.+?)\s*$"
    | rex field=message_text "<enteredCommand><cli>(?<parser_command>.*?)</cli>"
    | rex field=message_text "<user>(?<parser_user>[^<]+)</user>"
    | rex field=message_text "<srcIP>(?<parser_src_ip>[^<]+)</srcIP>"
    | eval command=lower(trim(coalesce(parser_command, eem_command, "")))
    | eval event_type=case(
        like(command, "configure http%") OR like(command, "ip http secure-server%"), "http_config",
        like(command, "line vty%"), "line_vty",
        like(command, "no access-class%"), "remove_access_class",
        like(command, "access-class%"), "add_access_class",
        true(), null())
    | where isnotnull(event_type)
    | eval user=coalesce(parser_user, user, "unknown")
    | eval src_ip=coalesce(parser_src_ip, src_ip, "unknown")
    | eval dest=coalesce(host, dvc, dest, "unknown")
    | bin _time span=1m
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
                  values(event_type) as event_types
                  values(user) as user
                  values(src_ip) as src_ip
                  values(command) as commands
      by _time dest
    | where mvfind(event_types, "line_vty") >= 0
            AND
            mvfind(event_types, "remove_access_class") >= 0
            AND
            mvfind(event_types, "add_access_class") >= 0
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `cisco_ios_xe_vty_access_class_tampering_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    Use the Cisco Catalyst Add-on for Splunk (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/7538) to Ingest Cisco IOS-XE syslog with sourcetype "cisco:ios" and enable archive/config command logging.
known_false_positives: |
    VTY ACL changes occur during legitimate management access updates. Filter approved maintenance windows and known administrators.
references:
    - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa25-239a
    - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/salt-typhoon-analysis/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Cisco IOS-XE VTY access-class settings were removed and reapplied on $dest$ by $user$.
threat_objects:
    - field: commands
      type: command
analytic_story:
    - Salt Typhoon
asset_type: Network
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1562
    - T1021
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: application
security_domain: network
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/emerging_threats/SaltTyphoon/salttyphoon_cisco.log
          source: ctb:catalyst:syslog
          sourcetype: cisco:ios
      test_type: unit

[[ currentRule.title && currentRule.title.length > 60 ? currentRule.title.slice(0, 60) + '…' : currentRule.title ]]

5ac256bd-b451-45df-bb1d-b6e864075dfe

Propose edits, view related rules, and engage with the community through comments.

Executable code, not a declarative rule

This submission is arbitrary [[ currentRule.format ? currentRule.format.toUpperCase() : '' ]] code, not a declarative detection rule — review it as you would any script before running it, and note that it cannot be safely aggregated or auto-executed alongside YARA/Sigma/Suricata/CRS rules.

Rejected pattern present

[[ reason ]]

What does this mean?

Format & documentation suggestions

Not a security issue — this rule is valid and was accepted as-is. These are optional fields/conventions its own format recommends, mainly affecting its quality score and how well it documents itself for other reviewers.

[[ reason ]]

What do these messages mean?

[[ currentRule.title && currentRule.title.length > 60 ? currentRule.title.slice(0, 60) + '…' : currentRule.title ]]

[[ currentRule.title ]]

Community Discussion