WMI Permanent Event Subscription

SPLUNK detection rule by Rico Valdez, Splunk · Apache-2.0

The following analytic detects the creation of permanent event subscriptions using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). It leverages Sysmon EventID 5 data to identify instances where the event consumers are not the expected "NTEventLogEventConsumer." This activity is significant because it suggests an attacker is attempting to achieve persistence by running malicious scripts or binaries in response to specific system events. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to severe impacts such as data theft, ransomware deployment, or other damaging outcomes. Investigate the associated scripts or binaries to identify the source of the attack.

name: WMI Permanent Event Subscription
id: 71bfdb13-f200-4c6c-b2c9-a2e07adf437d
version: 10
creation_date: '2020-04-29'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
status: experimental
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation of permanent event subscriptions using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). It leverages Sysmon EventID 5 data to identify instances where the event consumers are not the expected "NTEventLogEventConsumer." This activity is significant because it suggests an attacker is attempting to achieve persistence by running malicious scripts or binaries in response to specific system events. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to severe impacts such as data theft, ransomware deployment, or other damaging outcomes. Investigate the associated scripts or binaries to identify the source of the attack.
data_source: []
search: |-
    `wmi`
    EventCode=5861
    Binding
    | rex field=Message "Consumer =\s+(?<consumer>[^;|^$]+)"
    | search consumer!="NTEventLogEventConsumer=\"SCM Event Log Consumer\""
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
                  max(_time) as lastTime
      by ComputerName, consumer, Message
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | rename ComputerName as dest
    | `wmi_permanent_event_subscription_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting the Windows WMI activity logs. This can be done by adding a stanza to inputs.conf on the system generating logs with a title of [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational].
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, administrators may use event subscriptions for legitimate purposes.
references: []
finding:
    title: WMI Permanent Event Subscription detected on $dest$
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Suspicious WMI Use
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1047
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint

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597d23e4-ff0e-4019-9566-df5b813477c8

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Executable code, not a declarative rule

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Format & documentation suggestions

Not a security issue — this rule is valid and was accepted as-is. These are optional fields/conventions its own format recommends, mainly affecting its quality score and how well it documents itself for other reviewers.

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