MacOS plutil

SPLUNK detection rule by Patrick Bareiss, Splunk · Apache-2.0

The following analytic detects the usage of the `plutil` command to modify plist files on macOS systems. It leverages osquery to monitor process events, specifically looking for executions of `/usr/bin/plutil`. This activity is significant because adversaries can use `plutil` to alter plist files, potentially adding malicious binaries or command-line arguments that execute upon user logon or system startup. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to achieve persistence, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a significant threat to the system's security.

name: MacOS plutil
id: c11f2b57-92c1-4cd2-b46c-064eafb833ac
version: 11
creation_date: '2022-03-04'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the usage of the `plutil` command to modify plist files on macOS systems. It leverages osquery to monitor process events, specifically looking for executions of `/usr/bin/plutil`. This activity is significant because adversaries can use `plutil` to alter plist files, potentially adding malicious binaries or command-line arguments that execute upon user logon or system startup. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to achieve persistence, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a significant threat to the system's security.
data_source:
    - Osquery Results
search: "`osquery_macro` name=es_process_events columns.path=/usr/bin/plutil\n  | rename columns.* as *\n  | stats count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime\n    BY username host cmdline\n       pid path parent\n       signing_id\n  | rename username as user, cmdline as process, path as process_path, host as dest\n  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`\n  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`\n  | `macos_plutil_filter`"
how_to_implement: This detection uses osquery and endpoint security on MacOS. Follow the link in references, which describes how to setup process auditing in MacOS with endpoint security and osquery.
known_false_positives: Administrators using plutil to change plist files.
references:
    - https://osquery.readthedocs.io/en/stable/deployment/process-auditing/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: '0'
finding:
    title: plutil are executed on $dest$ from $user$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: plutil are executed on $dest$ from $user$
analytic_story:
    - Living Off The Land
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1647
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1647/atomic_red_team/osquery.log
          source: osquery
          sourcetype: osquery:results
      test_type: unit

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