Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery

SPLUNK detection rule by Mauricio Velazco, Splunk · Apache-2.0

The following analytic detects the use of PowerView commandlets to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify specific commands like `Get-DomainComputer` or `Get-NetComputer` with the `-Unconstrained` parameter. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries or Red Teams to map out privileged delegation settings in Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to identify high-value targets for further exploitation, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.

name: Windows PowerView Unconstrained Delegation Discovery
id: fbf9e47f-e531-4fea-942d-5c95af7ed4d6
version: 11
creation_date: '2022-03-28'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the use of PowerView commandlets to discover Windows endpoints with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to identify specific commands like `Get-DomainComputer` or `Get-NetComputer` with the `-Unconstrained` parameter. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries or Red Teams to map out privileged delegation settings in Active Directory. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to identify high-value targets for further exploitation, potentially leading to privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
    - Powershell Script Block Logging 4104
search: |-
    `powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText = "*Get-DomainComputer*" OR ScriptBlockText = "*Get-NetComputer*") AND (ScriptBlockText = "*-Unconstrained*")
      | fillnull
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest signature signature_id
           user_id vendor_product EventID
           Guid Opcode Name
           Path ProcessID ScriptBlockId
           ScriptBlockText
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_powerview_unconstrained_delegation_discovery_filter`
how_to_implement: The following  analytic requires PowerShell operational logs to be imported. Modify the powershell macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index. This analytic is specific to 4104, or PowerShell Script Block Logging.
known_false_positives: Administrators or power users may leverage PowerView for system management or troubleshooting.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1667
    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/cas-isp-unconstrained-kerberos
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/domain-compromise-via-unrestricted-kerberos-delegation
    - https://www.cyberark.com/resources/threat-research-blog/weakness-within-kerberos-delegation
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user_id$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$" user_id = "$user_id$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user_id$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user_id$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainComputer was identified on endpoint $dest$
    entity:
        field: user_id
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: Suspicious PowerShell Get-DomainComputer was identified on endpoint $dest$
analytic_story:
    - CISA AA23-347A
    - Rhysida Ransomware
    - Active Directory Kerberos Attacks
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1018
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/windows_powerview_constrained_delegation_discovery/windows-xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

[[ currentRule.title && currentRule.title.length > 60 ? currentRule.title.slice(0, 60) + '…' : currentRule.title ]]

e90446f1-2c5f-4e67-84e8-06f307a5d02c

Propose edits, view related rules, and engage with the community through comments.

Executable code, not a declarative rule

This submission is arbitrary [[ currentRule.format ? currentRule.format.toUpperCase() : '' ]] code, not a declarative detection rule — review it as you would any script before running it, and note that it cannot be safely aggregated or auto-executed alongside YARA/Sigma/Suricata/CRS rules.

Rejected pattern present

[[ reason ]]

What does this mean?

Format & documentation suggestions

Not a security issue — this rule is valid and was accepted as-is. These are optional fields/conventions its own format recommends, mainly affecting its quality score and how well it documents itself for other reviewers.

[[ reason ]]

What do these messages mean?

[[ currentRule.title && currentRule.title.length > 60 ? currentRule.title.slice(0, 60) + '…' : currentRule.title ]]

[[ currentRule.title ]]

Community Discussion