Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added

SPLUNK detection rule by Mauricio Velazco, Splunk · Apache-2.0

The following analytic detects the addition of a new member to the DnsAdmins group in Active Directory by leveraging Event ID 4732. This detection uses security event logs to identify changes to this high-privilege group. Monitoring this activity is crucial because members of the DnsAdmins group can manage the DNS service, often running on Domain Controllers, and potentially execute malicious code with SYSTEM privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges and gain control over critical domain services, posing a significant security risk.

name: Windows DnsAdmins New Member Added
id: 27e600aa-77f8-4614-bc80-2662a67e2f48
version: 12
creation_date: '2023-03-28'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the addition of a new member to the DnsAdmins group in Active Directory by leveraging Event ID 4732. This detection uses security event logs to identify changes to this high-privilege group. Monitoring this activity is crucial because members of the DnsAdmins group can manage the DNS service, often running on Domain Controllers, and potentially execute malicious code with SYSTEM privileges. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges and gain control over critical domain services, posing a significant security risk.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4732
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4732 TargetUserName=DnsAdmins
      | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(TargetUserName) as target_users_added values(user) as user
        BY dest src_user
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_dnsadmins_new_member_added_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, Domain Controller events need to be ingested. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Security Group Management` within `Account Management` needs to be enabled.
known_false_positives: New members can be added to the DnsAdmins group as part of legitimate administrative tasks. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
    - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/from-dnsadmins-to-system-to-domain-compromise
    - https://www.hackingarticles.in/windows-privilege-escalation-dnsadmins-to-domainadmin/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4732
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$src_user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  src_user = "$src_user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$src_user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$src_user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: A new member $user$ added to the DnsAdmins group by $src_user$
    entity:
        field: src_user
        type: user
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Active Directory Privilege Escalation
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1098
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098/dnsadmins_member_added/windows-security.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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95b587e5-9971-4d9d-92f5-8746f790729c

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Executable code, not a declarative rule

This submission is arbitrary [[ currentRule.format ? currentRule.format.toUpperCase() : '' ]] code, not a declarative detection rule — review it as you would any script before running it, and note that it cannot be safely aggregated or auto-executed alongside YARA/Sigma/Suricata/CRS rules.

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Format & documentation suggestions

Not a security issue — this rule is valid and was accepted as-is. These are optional fields/conventions its own format recommends, mainly affecting its quality score and how well it documents itself for other reviewers.

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