Windows Create Local Account

SPLUNK detection rule by Michael Haag, Splunk · Apache-2.0

The following analytic detects the creation of a new local user account on a Windows system. It leverages Windows Security Audit logs, specifically event ID 4720, to identify this activity. Monitoring the creation of local accounts is crucial for a SOC as it can indicate unauthorized access or lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.

name: Windows Create Local Account
id: 3fb2e8e3-7bc0-4567-9722-c5ab9f8595eb
version: 13
creation_date: '2022-10-05'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the creation of a new local user account on a Windows system. It leverages Windows Security Audit logs, specifically event ID 4720, to identify this activity. Monitoring the creation of local accounts is crucial for a SOC as it can indicate unauthorized access or lateral movement within the network. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to establish persistence, escalate privileges, or gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4720
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      values(All_Changes.result_id) as result_id
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Change where
    All_Changes.result_id=4720
    by All_Changes.user All_Changes.dest All_Changes.result All_Changes.action
    | `drop_dm_object_name("All_Changes")`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `windows_create_local_account_filter`
how_to_implement: 'This search requires you to have enabled your Group Management Audit Logs in your Local Windows Security Policy and be ingesting those logs.  More information on how to enable them can be found here: http://whatevernetworks.com/auditing-group-membership-changes-in-active-directory/'
known_false_positives: |
    It is possible that an administrator created the account. Verifying activity with an administrator is advised.
    Accounts created on Domain Controllers will trigger this too. Exclude if it becomes too noisy.
    This analytic is set to anomaly to allow for risk to be added. Filter and tune as needed.
    Restrict to critical infrastructure to reduce any volume.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/03/21/apt35-automates-initial-access-using-proxyshell/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: The following $user$ was added to $dest$ as a local account.
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: The following $user$ was added to $dest$ as a local account.
analytic_story:
    - Active Directory Password Spraying
    - CISA AA24-241A
    - GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
    - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1136.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1136.001/atomic_red_team/4720.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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d1094118-9624-4ee6-9649-85e463fced1c

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