Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Copied in TEMP Dir

SPLUNK detection rule by Teoderick Contreras, Splunk · Apache-2.0

The following analytic detects the copying of Chrome's Local State and Login Data files into temporary folders, a tactic often used by the Braodo stealer malware. These files contain encrypted user credentials, including saved passwords and login session details. The detection monitors for suspicious copying activity involving these specific Chrome files, particularly in temp directories where malware typically processes the stolen data. Identifying this behavior enables security teams to act quickly, preventing attackers from decrypting and exfiltrating sensitive browser credentials and mitigating the risk of unauthorized access.

name: Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome Copied in TEMP Dir
id: 4d14c86d-fdee-4393-94da-238d2706902f
version: 11
creation_date: '2024-10-18'
modification_date: '2026-06-25'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the copying of Chrome's Local State and Login Data files into temporary folders, a tactic often used by the Braodo stealer malware. These files contain encrypted user credentials, including saved passwords and login session details. The detection monitors for suspicious copying activity involving these specific Chrome files, particularly in temp directories where malware typically processes the stolen data. Identifying this behavior enables security teams to act quickly, preventing attackers from decrypting and exfiltrating sensitive browser credentials and mitigating the risk of unauthorized access.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 11
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name IN ("Local State", "Login Data") Filesystem.file_path = "*\\temp\\*" by Filesystem.action Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_access_time Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.file_hash Filesystem.file_modify_time Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_acl Filesystem.file_size Filesystem.process_guid Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.user Filesystem.vendor_product | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_credentials_from_password_stores_chrome_copied_in_temp_dir_filter`'
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Filesystem` node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://x.com/suyog41/status/1825869470323056748
    - https://g0njxa.medium.com/from-vietnam-to-united-states-malware-fraud-and-dropshipping-98b7a7b2c36d
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: Chrome Password Store File [$file_name$] was copied in %temp% folder on [$dest$].
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Braodo Stealer
    - Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters
    - BlankGrabber Stealer
    - Phantom Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1555.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1555.003/browser_credential_info_temp/braodo_browser_info.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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791dc2be-6ac2-4776-a701-a760026d8b1d

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