Windows Service Create RemComSvc

SPLUNK detection rule by Michael Haag, Splunk · Apache-2.0

The following analytic detects the creation of the RemComSvc service on a Windows endpoint, typically indicating lateral movement using RemCom.exe. It leverages Windows EventCode 7045 from the System event log, specifically looking for the "RemCom Service" name. This activity is significant as it often signifies unauthorized lateral movement within the network, which is a common tactic used by attackers to spread malware or gain further access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.

name: Windows Service Create RemComSvc
id: 0be4b5d6-c449-4084-b945-2392b519c33b
version: 10
creation_date: '2023-03-20'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the creation of the RemComSvc service on a Windows endpoint, typically indicating lateral movement using RemCom.exe. It leverages Windows EventCode 7045 from the System event log, specifically looking for the "RemCom Service" name. This activity is significant as it often signifies unauthorized lateral movement within the network, which is a common tactic used by attackers to spread malware or gain further access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive systems, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the network.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log System 7045
search: |-
    `wineventlog_system` EventCode=7045 ServiceName="RemCom Service"
      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
        BY dest ImagePath ServiceName
           ServiceType
      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
      | `windows_service_create_remcomsvc_filter`
how_to_implement: To implement this analytic, the Windows EventCode 7045 will need to be logged. The Windows TA for Splunk is also recommended.
known_false_positives: False positives may be present, filter as needed based on administrative activity.
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee/
    - https://github.com/kavika13/RemCom
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: A new service was created related to RemCom on $dest$.
analytic_story:
    - Active Directory Discovery
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1543.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1543.003/atomic_red_team/remcom_windows-system.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:System
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

[[ currentRule.title && currentRule.title.length > 60 ? currentRule.title.slice(0, 60) + '…' : currentRule.title ]]

d39f7816-bf98-418b-9247-61775eb60f48

Propose edits, view related rules, and engage with the community through comments.

Executable code, not a declarative rule

This submission is arbitrary [[ currentRule.format ? currentRule.format.toUpperCase() : '' ]] code, not a declarative detection rule — review it as you would any script before running it, and note that it cannot be safely aggregated or auto-executed alongside YARA/Sigma/Suricata/CRS rules.

Rejected pattern present

[[ reason ]]

What does this mean?

Format & documentation suggestions

Not a security issue — this rule is valid and was accepted as-is. These are optional fields/conventions its own format recommends, mainly affecting its quality score and how well it documents itself for other reviewers.

[[ reason ]]

What do these messages mean?

[[ currentRule.title && currentRule.title.length > 60 ? currentRule.title.slice(0, 60) + '…' : currentRule.title ]]

[[ currentRule.title ]]

Community Discussion