Suspicious wevtutil Usage
SPLUNK detection rule by David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk · Apache-2.0
The following analytic detects the usage of wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing event logs such as Application, Security, Setup, Trace, or System.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments.
This activity is significant because clearing event logs can be an attempt to cover tracks after malicious actions, hindering forensic investigations.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to erase evidence of their activities, making it difficult to trace their actions and understand the full scope of the compromise.
name: Suspicious wevtutil Usage
id: 2827c0fd-e1be-4868-ae25-59d28e0f9d4f
version: 21
creation_date: '2019-10-16'
modification_date: '2026-08-23'
author: David Dorsey, Michael Haag, Teoderick Contreras, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |-
The following analytic detects the usage of wevtutil.exe with parameters for clearing event logs such as Application, Security, Setup, Trace, or System.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments.
This activity is significant because clearing event logs can be an attempt to cover tracks after malicious actions, hindering forensic investigations.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to erase evidence of their activities, making it difficult to trace their actions and understand the full scope of the compromise.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
(
Processes.process_name="wevtutil.exe"
OR
Processes.original_file_name="wevtutil.exe"
)
Processes.process IN ("* cl *", "*clear-log*")
Processes.process IN (
"*/Trace*",
"*AMSI/Debug*",
"*Application*",
"*CiscoSecureEndpoint*",
"*Microsoft-Windows-BitLocker*",
"*Microsoft-Windows-Bits*",
"*Microsoft-Windows-CAPI2*",
"*Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File*",
"*Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process*",
"*Microsoft-Windows-LDAP*",
"*Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell*",
"*Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon*",
"*Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager*",
"*Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager*",
"*Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity*",
"*OpenSSH/*",
"*PowerShellCore/*",
"*Security*",
"*Setup*",
"*System*",
"*Windows Firewall With Advanced Security*",
"*Windows PowerShell*"
)
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `suspicious_wevtutil_usage_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: The wevtutil.exe application is a legitimate Windows event log utility. Administrators may use it to manage Windows event logs.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1070.001/T1070.001.md
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
finding:
title: Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$
entity:
field: user
type: user
score: 50
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 50
message: Wevtutil.exe being used to clear Event Logs on $dest$ by $user$
analytic_story:
- Windows Log Manipulation
- Ransomware
- Rhysida Ransomware
- Clop Ransomware
- CISA AA23-347A
- ShrinkLocker
- Storm-2460 CLFS Zero Day Exploitation
- Scattered Spider
- Storm-0501 Ransomware
- VoidLink Cloud-Native Linux Malware
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1685.005
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1070.001/windows_pwh_log_cleared/wevtutil_clear_log.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
CIRCL