Suspicious Process Executed From Container File

SPLUNK detection rule by Steven Dick · Apache-2.0

The following analytic identifies a suspicious process executed from within common container/archive file types such as ZIP, ISO, IMG, and others. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used by adversaries to execute scripts or evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.

name: Suspicious Process Executed From Container File
id: d8120352-3b62-411c-8cb6-7b47584dd5e8
version: 12
creation_date: '2023-07-11'
modification_date: '2026-07-09'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies a suspicious process executed from within common container/archive file types such as ZIP, ISO, IMG, and others. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it is a common technique used by adversaries to execute scripts or evade defenses. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
    count
    min(_time) as firstTime
    max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process IN (
        "*.ZIP\\*",
        "*.ISO\\*",
        "*.IMG\\*",
        "*.CAB\\*",
        "*.TAR\\*",
        "*.GZ\\*",
        "*.RAR\\*",
        "*.7Z\\*"
        )
        AND Processes.action="allowed"
    by
        Processes.action
        Processes.dest
        Processes.original_file_name
        Processes.parent_process
        Processes.parent_process_exec
        Processes.parent_process_guid
        Processes.parent_process_id
        Processes.parent_process_name
        Processes.parent_process_path
        Processes.process
        Processes.process_exec
        Processes.process_guid
        Processes.process_hash
        Processes.process_id
        Processes.process_integrity_level
        Processes.process_name
        Processes.process_path
        Processes.user
        Processes.user_id
        Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | regex process="(?i).*\.(zip|iso|img|cab|tar|gz|rar|7z)\\\\.+\.(bat|bin|cab|cmd|com|cpl|ex_|exe|gadget|inf1|ins|inx|htm|html|isu|jar|job|js|jse|lnk|msc|msi|msp|mst|paf|pif|ps1|reg|rgs|scr|sct|shb|shs|u3p|vb|vbe|vbs|vbscript|ws|wsf|wsh)\"?$"
    | rex field=process "(?i).+\\\\(?<file_name>[^\\\\]+\.(?:zip|iso|img|cab|tar|gz|rar|7z))\\\\(?:.+\\\\)?(?<container_file_name>[^\\\\\"]+\.(?:bat|bin|cab|cmd|com|cpl|ex_|exe|gadget|inf1|ins|inx|htm|html|isu|jar|job|js|jse|lnk|msc|msi|msp|mst|paf|pif|ps1|reg|rgs|scr|sct|shb|shs|u3p|vb|vbe|vbs|vbscript|ws|wsf|wsh))\"?$"
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `suspicious_process_executed_from_container_file_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Various business process or userland applications and behavior.
references:
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/tracking-evolution-gootloader-operations
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/weaponizing-disk-image-files-analysis/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: A suspicious file [$container_file_name$] was launched from container file [$file_name$] by process [$process_name$] on [$dest$].
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: A suspicious file [$container_file_name$] was launched from container file [$file_name$] by process [$process_name$] on [$dest$].
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
    - field: file_name
      type: file_name
    - field: container_file_name
      type: file_name
analytic_story:
    - APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
    - GhostRedirector IIS Module and Rungan Backdoor
    - Unusual Processes
    - Amadey
    - Remcos
    - Snake Keylogger
    - Water Gamayun
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1204.002
    - T1036.008
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/gootloader/partial_ttps/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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806a9598-0489-40e6-898d-3481e8c9b810

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Executable code, not a declarative rule

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