Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process

SPLUNK detection rule by Teoderick Contreras, Splunk · Apache-2.0

This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that uses several application tools that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script may execute suspicious code.

name: Wscript Or Cscript Suspicious Child Process
id: 1f35e1da-267b-11ec-90a9-acde48001122
version: 17
creation_date: '2021-10-06'
modification_date: '2026-07-20'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: This analytic identifies a suspicious spawned process by WScript or CScript process. This technique was a common technique used by adversaries and malware to execute different LOLBIN, other scripts like PowerShell or spawn a suspended process to inject its code as a defense evasion. This TTP may detect some normal script that uses several application tools that are in the list of the child process it detects but a good pivot and indicator that a script may execute suspicious code.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: "| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes\n  WHERE Processes.parent_process_name IN (\"cscript.exe\", \"wscript.exe\") Processes.process_name IN (\"regsvr32.exe\", \"rundll32.exe\",\"winhlp32.exe\",\"certutil.exe\",\"msbuild.exe\",\"cmd.exe\",\"powershell*\",\"pwsh.exe\",\"wmic.exe\",\"mshta.exe\")\n  BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name\n     Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid\n     Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path\n     Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid\n     Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level\n     Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user\n     Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product\n| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`\n| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`\n| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`\n| `wscript_or_cscript_suspicious_child_process_filter`"
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Administrators may create vbs or js script that use several tool as part of its execution. Filter as needed.
references:
    - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120
    - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/01/15/destructive-malware-targeting-ukrainian-organizations/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$", "$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: '0'
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ on $dest$
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: wscript or cscript parent process spawned $process_name$ on $dest$
analytic_story:
    - Data Destruction
    - FIN7
    - NjRAT
    - Remcos
    - XWorm
    - WhisperGate
    - Unusual Processes
    - ShrinkLocker
    - 0bj3ctivity Stealer
    - MuddyWater
    - Axios Supply Chain Post Compromise
    - VIP Keylogger
    - Starland RAT Campaign
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1055
    - T1134.004
    - T1543
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1059.005/vbs_wscript/sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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04a6db1b-51f6-4c61-a1b0-906822ac5256

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Executable code, not a declarative rule

This submission is arbitrary [[ currentRule.format ? currentRule.format.toUpperCase() : '' ]] code, not a declarative detection rule — review it as you would any script before running it, and note that it cannot be safely aggregated or auto-executed alongside YARA/Sigma/Suricata/CRS rules.

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Format & documentation suggestions

Not a security issue — this rule is valid and was accepted as-is. These are optional fields/conventions its own format recommends, mainly affecting its quality score and how well it documents itself for other reviewers.

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