Windows Wmic Network Discovery

SPLUNK detection rule by Teoderick Contreras, Splunk · Apache-2.0

The following analytic detects the execution of Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) commands used for network interface discovery on a Windows system. Specifically, it identifies commands such as “wmic nic” that retrieve detailed information about the network adapters installed on the device. While these commands are commonly used by IT administrators for legitimate network inventory and diagnostics, they can also be leveraged by malicious actors for reconnaissance, enabling them to map network configurations and identify potential targets. Monitoring WMIC network interface queries allows security teams to detect suspicious or unauthorized enumeration activities, supporting early threat identification and response.ß

name: Windows Wmic Network Discovery
id: cce82b81-c716-4b6c-bac9-33e6a6925cc2
version: 5
creation_date: '2021-05-07'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the execution of Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) commands used for network interface discovery on a Windows system. Specifically, it identifies commands such as “wmic nic” that retrieve detailed information about the network adapters installed on the device. While these commands are commonly used by IT administrators for legitimate network inventory and diagnostics, they can also be leveraged by malicious actors for reconnaissance, enabling them to map network configurations and identify potential targets. Monitoring WMIC network interface queries allows security teams to detect suspicious or unauthorized enumeration activities, supporting early threat identification and response.ß
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE `process_wmic` (Processes.process="* nic*")
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_wmic_network_discovery_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Administrators may execute this command for testing or auditing.
references:
    - https://cert.gov.ua/article/6284730
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: user
          type: user
          score: 20
          message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to gather Network information.
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to gather Network information.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - LAMEHUG
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1082
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/lamehug/T1082/wmic_cmd/wmic_cmd.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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