Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command
SPLUNK detection rule by Michael Haag, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk · Apache-2.0
The following analytic detects MSIExec spawning multiple discovery commands.
This behavior is identified using data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where MSIExec is the parent process.
If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use these discovery commands to gather system information, potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.
name: Windows MSIExec Spawn Discovery Command
id: e9d05aa2-32f0-411b-930c-5b8ca5c4fcee
version: 16
creation_date: '2022-06-17'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: |-
The following analytic detects MSIExec spawning multiple discovery commands.
This behavior is identified using data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where MSIExec is the parent process.
If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use these discovery commands to gather system information, potentially leading to further exploitation or lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
- Windows Event Log Security 4688
- CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
Processes.parent_process_name=msiexec.exe
(
Processes.process_name IN (
"arp.exe"
"dsget.exe",
"hostname.exe",
"ipconfig.exe",
"nbtstat.exe",
"netdom.exe",
"nltest.exe",
"ntdsutil.exe",
"qprocess.exe",
"qwinsta.exe",
"systeminfo.exe"
"wmic.exe"
)
OR
(
Processes.process_name IN (
"bash.exe",
"cmd.exe",
"powershell.exe",
"powershell_ise.exe",
"pwsh.exe"
)
(
Processes.process IN (
"*arp *",
"*dsget*",
"*hostname*",
"*ipconfig*",
"*nbtstat*",
"*netdom*",
"*nltest*",
"*ntdsutil*",
"*qprocess *",
"*qwinsta*",
"*systeminfo*",
"*wmic *"
)
OR
(
(
Processes.process IN (
"*net *",
"*net.exe *",
"*net1*"
"*net1.exe*"
)
OR
Processes.process_name IN (
"net.exe",
"net1.exe"
)
)
Processes.process = "*view*"
)
OR
(
(
Processes.process IN (
"*reg *",
"*reg.exe *"
"*sc *",
"*sc.exe *",
)
OR
Processes.process_name IN (
"reg.exe",
"sc.exe"
)
)
Processes.process = "*query*"
NOT Processes.process = "* /SC *"
)
OR
(
(
Processes.process IN (
"*query *",
"*query.exe*"
)
OR
Processes.process_name = "query.exe"
)
Processes.process IN (
"* process",
"* session",
"* user",
)
)
)
)
)
BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_msiexec_spawn_discovery_command_filter`
how_to_implement: |-
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives might still be present, depending on the installer. Filter as needed.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: 7d
latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
entities:
- field: user
type: user
score: 30
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running different discovery commands.
- field: dest
type: system
score: 30
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ running different discovery commands.
threat_objects:
- field: parent_process_name
type: parent_process_name
- field: process_name
type: process_name
analytic_story:
- Windows System Binary Proxy Execution MSIExec
- Medusa Ransomware
- Water Gamayun
- StealC Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1218.007
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.007/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
test_type: unit
CIRCL