Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments

SPLUNK detection rule by Michael Haag, Splunk · Apache-2.0

The following analytic detects instances of regsvcs.exe running without command line arguments. This behavior typically indicates process injection, where another process manipulates regsvcs.exe. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, IDs, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may signal an attempt to evade detection and execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could achieve code execution, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or access to sensitive information.

name: Detect Regsvcs with No Command Line Arguments
id: 6b74d578-a02e-4e94-a0d1-39440d0bf254
version: 15
creation_date: '2021-02-16'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects instances of regsvcs.exe running without command line arguments. This behavior typically indicates process injection, where another process manipulates regsvcs.exe. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, IDs, and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it may signal an attempt to evade detection and execute malicious code. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could achieve code execution, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or access to sensitive information.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
    as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
    (Processes.process_name=regsvcs.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=RegSvcs.exe)
    Processes.process IN ("*regsvcs","*regsvcs.exe", "*regsvcs.exe\"")
    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec
       Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name
       Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
       Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name
       Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `detect_regsvcs_with_no_command_line_arguments_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/009/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.009/T1218.009.md
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: The process $process_name$ was spawned by $parent_process_name$ without any command-line arguments on $dest$ by $user$.
threat_objects:
    - field: parent_process_name
      type: parent_process_name
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - Suspicious Regsvcs Regasm Activity
    - Living Off The Land
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1218.009
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1218.009/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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