Windows AdFind Exe

SPLUNK detection rule by Jose Hernandez, Bhavin Patel, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk · Apache-2.0

The following analytic identifies the execution of `adfind.exe` standalone or with specific command-line arguments related to Active Directory queries. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and parent Processes. This activity is significant because `adfind.exe` is a powerful tool often used by threat actors like Wizard Spider and FIN6 to gather sensitive AD information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the AD environment, facilitating further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.

name: Windows AdFind Exe
id: bd3b0187-189b-46c0-be45-f52da2bae67f
version: 14
creation_date: '2020-12-17'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Jose Hernandez, Bhavin Patel, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies the execution of `adfind.exe` standalone or with specific command-line arguments related to Active Directory queries. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and parent Processes. This activity is significant because `adfind.exe` is a powerful tool often used by threat actors like Wizard Spider and FIN6 to gather sensitive AD information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the AD environment, facilitating further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where

    (
      Processes.process_name = "AdFind.exe"
      OR
      Processes.original_file_name = "AdFind.exe"
    )
    OR
    (
      Processes.process IN ("* -f *", "* /f*")
      Processes.process = "*objectcategory=*"
    )
    OR
    (
      Processes.process IN ("* -sc *", "* /sc *")
      Processes.process IN ("* -gcb *", "* /gcb *")
    )
    OR
    (
      Processes.process IN ("* -sc *", "* /sc *")
      Processes.process IN (
            "* trustdmp*",
            "* dclist*",
            "* dcdmp*",
            "* adobjcnt*",
            "* adamobjcnt*",
            "* sdump*",
            "* exchaddresses*",
            "* getacl*",
            "* domainlist*",
            "* export_user*",
            "* export_group*",
            "* admincountdmp*"
      )
    )
    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
    Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
    Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process Processes.process_exec
    Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
    Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_adfind_exe_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: ADfind is a command-line tool for AD administration and management that is seen to be leveraged by various adversaries. Filter out legitimate administrator usage using the filter macro.
references:
    - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/
    - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/a-nasty-trick-from-credential-theft-malware-to-business-disruption
    - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/index.htm
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/05/22/icedid-macro-ends-in-nokoyawa-ransomware/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: $user$ spawned $process$ indicative of Active Directory discovery on machine - [$dest$]
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
analytic_story:
    - Domain Trust Discovery
    - IcedID
    - NOBELIUM Group
    - Graceful Wipe Out Attack
    - BlackSuit Ransomware
asset_type: Endpoint
atomic_guid:
    - 736b4f53-f400-4c22-855d-1a6b5a551600
    - b95fd967-4e62-4109-b48d-265edfd28c3a
    - e1ec8d20-509a-4b9a-b820-06c9b2da8eb7
    - 5e2938fb-f919-47b6-8b29-2f6a1f718e99
    - abf00f6c-9983-4d9a-afbc-6b1c6c6448e1
    - 51a98f96-0269-4e09-a10f-e307779a8b05
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1018
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1018/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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7dad5ffc-5d69-487d-9ce7-b1bef0d9a596

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