Potential Telegram API Request Via CommandLine

SPLUNK detection rule by Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk, Zaki Zarkasih Al Mustafa · Apache-2.0

The following analytic detects the presence of "api.telegram.org" in the CommandLine of a process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity can be significant as the telegram API has been used as an exfiltration mechanism or even as a C2 channel. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker or malware to exfiltrate data or receive additional C2 instruction, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.

name: Potential Telegram API Request Via CommandLine
id: d6b0d627-d0bf-46b1-936f-c48284767d21
version: 10
creation_date: '2025-02-19'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk, Zaki Zarkasih Al Mustafa
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects the presence of "api.telegram.org" in the CommandLine of a process. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity can be significant as the telegram API has been used as an exfiltration mechanism or even as a C2 channel. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker or malware to exfiltrate data or receive additional C2 instruction, potentially leading to further compromise and persistence within the network.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE Processes.process= "*api.telegram.org*" NOT Processes.process IN ("*-osint -url*", "* --single-argument*")
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `potential_telegram_api_request_via_commandline_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positive may stem from application or users requesting the API directly via CommandLine for testing purposes. Investigate the matches and apply the necessary filters.
references:
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/0b3ef5e04329cefb5bb4bf30b3edcb32d1ec6bbcb29d22695a079bfb5b56e8ac/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/72c59eeb15b5ec1d95e72e4b06a030bc058822bc10e5cb807e78a4624d329666/behavior
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/72c59eeb15b5ec1d95e72e4b06a030bc058822bc10e5cb807e78a4624d329666/content
    - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1c4541bf70b6e251ef024ec4dde8dce400539c2368461c0d90e15a81b11ace44/content
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 20
          message: Process $process_name$ with command line $process$ in $dest$
threat_objects:
    - field: process_name
      type: process_name
analytic_story:
    - XMRig
    - Water Gamayun
    - 0bj3ctivity Stealer
    - Hellcat Ransomware
    - BlankGrabber Stealer
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1102.002
    - T1041
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1102.002/telegram_api_cli/telegram_cli.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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