Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity

SPLUNK detection rule by Dean Luxton · Apache-2.0

The following analytic identifies unauthorized replication RPC calls from non-domain controller devices. It leverages Zeek wire data to detect specific RPC operations like DrsReplicaAdd and DRSGetNCChanges, filtering out legitimate domain controllers. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to introduce a rogue domain controller, which can compromise the integrity of the Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to manipulate directory data, escalate privileges, and persist within the network, posing a severe security risk.

name: Windows AD Rogue Domain Controller Network Activity
id: c4aeeeef-da7f-4338-b3ba-553cbcbe2138
version: 9
creation_date: '2023-04-11'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Dean Luxton
status: experimental
type: TTP
description: The following analytic identifies unauthorized replication RPC calls from non-domain controller devices. It leverages Zeek wire data to detect specific RPC operations like DrsReplicaAdd and DRSGetNCChanges, filtering out legitimate domain controllers. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to introduce a rogue domain controller, which can compromise the integrity of the Active Directory environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to manipulate directory data, escalate privileges, and persist within the network, posing a severe security risk.
data_source: []
search: |-
    `zeek_rpc` DrsReplicaAdd OR DRSGetNCChanges
      | where NOT (dest_category="Domain Controller") OR NOT (src_category="Domain Controller")
      | fillnull value="Unknown" src_category, dest_category
      | table _time endpoint operation src src_category dest dest_category
      | `windows_ad_rogue_domain_controller_network_activity_filter`
how_to_implement: Run zeek on domain controllers to capture the DCE RPC calls, ensure the domain controller categories are defined in Assets and Identities.
known_false_positives: No false positives have been identified at this time.
references:
    - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
finding:
    title: Rogue DC Activity Detected from $src_category$ device $src$ to $dest$ ($dest_category$)
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: src
      type: ip_address
analytic_story:
    - Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1207
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: network
security_domain: network

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