DNF Package Manager Plugin File Creation
ELASTIC detection rule by Elastic · Elastic License v2
Detects file creation events in the plugin directories for the Yum package manager. In Linux, DNF (Dandified YUM) is a
command-line utility used for handling packages on Fedora-based systems, providing functions for installing, updating,
upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor DNF to gain
persistence by injecting malicious code into plugins that DNF runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or
control each time DNF is used for package management.
[metadata]
creation_date = "2024/06/25"
integration = ["endpoint", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/03/24"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Detects file creation events in the plugin directories for the Yum package manager. In Linux, DNF (Dandified YUM) is a
command-line utility used for handling packages on Fedora-based systems, providing functions for installing, updating,
upgrading, and removing software along with managing package repositories. Attackers can backdoor DNF to gain
persistence by injecting malicious code into plugins that DNF runs, thereby ensuring continued unauthorized access or
control each time DNF is used for package management.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.file*", "logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*", "endgame-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "DNF Package Manager Plugin File Creation"
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
### Investigating DNF Package Manager Plugin File Creation
DNF, a package manager for Fedora-based Linux systems, manages software installations and updates. It uses plugins to extend functionality, which can be targeted by attackers to insert malicious code, ensuring persistence and evasion. The detection rule monitors file creation in plugin directories, excluding legitimate processes, to identify unauthorized modifications indicative of potential backdoor activities.
### Possible investigation steps
- Review the file creation event details, focusing on the file path to confirm if it matches the monitored plugin directories: "/usr/lib/python*/site-packages/dnf-plugins/*" or "/etc/dnf/plugins/*".
- Identify the process responsible for the file creation by examining the process.executable field, ensuring it is not one of the legitimate processes listed in the exclusion criteria.
- Check the file extension of the newly created file to ensure it is not one of the excluded extensions like "swp", "swpx", or "swx".
- Investigate the origin and legitimacy of the process by reviewing its parent process and command line arguments to determine if it aligns with expected behavior.
- Correlate the event with any recent changes or updates in the system that might explain the file creation, such as package installations or system updates.
- Search for any additional suspicious activity or anomalies in the system logs around the time of the alert to identify potential indicators of compromise.
- If the file creation is deemed suspicious, consider isolating the affected system and conducting a deeper forensic analysis to assess the scope and impact of the potential threat.
### False positive analysis
- Legitimate software updates or installations may trigger file creation events in the DNF plugin directories. Users can mitigate this by ensuring that the processes involved in these updates are included in the exclusion list of the detection rule.
- System maintenance scripts or automated tasks that modify or create files in the plugin directories can be mistaken for malicious activity. To handle this, identify these scripts and add their executables to the exclusion list.
- Temporary files created by text editors or system processes, such as those with extensions like "swp", "swpx", or "swx", can be excluded by ensuring these extensions are part of the rule's exclusion criteria.
- Custom scripts or tools that interact with DNF plugins for legitimate purposes should be reviewed and, if deemed safe, their executables should be added to the exclusion list to prevent false positives.
- Processes running from directories like "/nix/store/*" or "/var/lib/dpkg/*" may be part of legitimate package management activities. Users should verify these processes and include them in the exclusion list if they are non-threatening.
### Response and remediation
- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or lateral movement by the attacker.
- Conduct a thorough review of the newly created or modified files in the DNF plugin directories to identify any malicious code or unauthorized changes.
- Remove any identified malicious files or code from the DNF plugin directories to eliminate the backdoor and restore the integrity of the package manager.
- Revert any unauthorized changes to the system configuration or software settings to their original state using verified backups or system snapshots.
- Update all system packages and plugins to the latest versions to patch any vulnerabilities that may have been exploited by the attacker.
- Monitor the affected system and network for any signs of continued unauthorized access or suspicious activity, using enhanced logging and alerting mechanisms.
- Escalate the incident to the appropriate internal security team or external cybersecurity experts for further investigation and to ensure comprehensive remediation."""
references = [
"https://pwnshift.github.io/2020/10/01/persistence.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/sequel-on-persistence-mechanisms",
]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "3fe4e20c-a600-4a86-9d98-3ecb1ef23550"
setup = """## Setup
This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
#### Prerequisite Requirements:
- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
- Click "Save and Continue".
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Persistence",
"Tactic: Defense Evasion",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Data Source: SentinelOne",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action in ("rename", "creation") and
file.path like ("/usr/lib/python*/site-packages/dnf-plugins/*", "/etc/dnf/plugins/*") and not (
process.executable in (
"/bin/dockerd", "/usr/bin/dockerd", "/usr/sbin/dockerd", "/bin/microdnf", "/usr/bin/microdnf", "/bin/rpm",
"/usr/bin/rpm", "/bin/snapd", "/usr/bin/snapd", "/bin/yum", "/usr/bin/yum", "/bin/dnf", "/usr/bin/dnf",
"/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/bin/dnf-automatic", "/usr/bin/dnf-automatic", "/sbin/apk", "/usr/sbin/apk",
"/usr/local/sbin/apk", "/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/puppet", "/bin/puppet",
"/opt/puppetlabs/puppet/bin/puppet", "/usr/bin/chef-client", "/bin/chef-client", "/bin/autossl_check",
"/usr/bin/autossl_check", "/proc/self/exe", "/usr/lib/snapd/snapd", "/usr/local/bin/dockerd",
"/usr/libexec/netplan/generate", "./usr/bin/podman", "/usr/bin/dnf5", "/bin/needs-restarting",
"/usr/bin/crio", "/usr/bin/insights-client", "/kaniko/executor"
) or
file.extension in ("swp", "swpx", "swx") or
process.executable : (
"/nix/store/*", "/var/lib/dpkg/*", "/tmp/vmis.*", "/snap/*", "/dev/fd/*", "/usr/lib/*", "/usr/libexec/*",
"/etc/kernel/*"
) or
process.executable == null or
(process.name == "sed" and file.name : "sed*") or
(process.name == "perl" and file.name : "e2scrub_all.tmp*") or
file.path like~ "/etc/dnf/plugins/.ansible_tmp*" or
process.name like~ ("ssm-agent-worker, NinjaOrbit", "python*")
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1543"
name = "Create or Modify System Process"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1546"
name = "Event Triggered Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1546.016"
name = "Installer Packages"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/016/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1574"
name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1574"
name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1546"
name = "Event Triggered Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1546.016"
name = "Installer Packages"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/016/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1574"
name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"