AWS IAM Customer Managed Policy Version Created or Default Version Set
ELASTIC detection rule by Elastic · Elastic License v2
Identifies successful IAM API calls that create a new customer managed policy version or set the default version for an
existing customer managed policy. Attackers with `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` or `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` on a
privileged policy can introduce a permissive policy document and activate it, escalating effective permissions without
attaching a new policy. These APIs are high impact when the target policy is attached to powerful roles or users.
[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/04/08"
integration = ["aws"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/08/05"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies successful IAM API calls that create a new customer managed policy version or set the default version for an
existing customer managed policy. Attackers with `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` or `iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion` on a
privileged policy can introduce a permissive policy document and activate it, escalating effective permissions without
attaching a new policy. These APIs are high impact when the target policy is attached to powerful roles or users.
"""
false_positives = [
"""
Infrastructure-as-code, CI/CD, and IAM administrators routinely publish new policy versions or roll back defaults.
Validate the policy ARN, change tickets, and whether the policy document broadens permissions. Exclude automation
roles or pipelines after review.
""",
]
from = "now-6m"
index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "AWS IAM Customer Managed Policy Version Created or Default Version Set"
note = """## Triage and analysis
### Investigating AWS IAM Customer Managed Policy Version Created or Default Version Set
`CreatePolicyVersion` uploads a new immutable version of a customer managed policy. `SetDefaultPolicyVersion` switches
which version principals evaluate—immediately changing effective access if the policy is already attached.
#### Possible investigation steps
- From `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters`, extract `policyArn`, `policyDocument` (if present), and `setAsDefault`.
- Map the policy ARN to attached users, groups, and roles; prioritize policies attached to admin or break-glass roles.
- Compare the new or selected version to prior versions in IAM or version history for added `Action`/`Resource` wildcards.
- Review `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn`, `source.ip`, and `user_agent.original` for interactive vs automation context.
- Correlate with `AttachUserPolicy`, `AttachRolePolicy`, or `CreatePolicyVersion` spikes from the same principal.
### False positive analysis
- Planned policy releases and rollbacks are expected in mature shops; baseline known publishers.
### Response and remediation
- If malicious: set default to a known-good version, delete bad versions where supported, detach policy if necessary, and
revoke excess `iam:*` on the actor.
### Additional information
- [CreatePolicyVersion](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_CreatePolicyVersion.html)
- [SetDefaultPolicyVersion](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_SetDefaultPolicyVersion.html)
"""
references = [
"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_CreatePolicyVersion.html",
"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_SetDefaultPolicyVersion.html",
"https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "d4e8f0a1-2b3c-4d5e-a6f7-8b9c0d1e2f3a"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Cloud",
"Domain: Identity",
"Platform: AWS",
"Data Source: AWS CloudTrail",
"Service: AWS IAM",
"Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
"Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL)",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"
query = '''
event.dataset: "aws.cloudtrail"
and event.provider: "iam.amazonaws.com"
and event.action: ("CreatePolicyVersion" or "SetDefaultPolicyVersion")
and event.outcome: "success"
and not aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type: "AWSService"
and not aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn:arn*/terraform
and not source.as.organization.name:(Amazon* or AMAZON* or "Google LLC" or "MongoDB, Inc.")
and not source.address: ( "cloudformation.amazonaws.com" or "servicecatalog.amazonaws.com")
and not user_agent.original: (*Terraform* or *Pulumi*)
'''
[rule.investigation_fields]
field_names = [
"@timestamp",
"user.name",
"user_agent.original",
"source.ip",
"aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn",
"aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.type",
"aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id",
"aws.cloudtrail.resources.arn",
"aws.cloudtrail.resources.type",
"event.action",
"event.outcome",
"cloud.account.id",
"cloud.region",
"aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters",
"aws.cloudtrail.response_elements",
]
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1098"
name = "Account Manipulation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1548"
name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.005"
name = "Temporary Elevated Cloud Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"