M365 Identity OAuth ROPC Grant via Legacy Authentication Client
ELASTIC detection rule by Elastic · Elastic License v2
Identifies a successful login by a user principal through a legacy authenticated client (such as Authenticated SMTP,
IMAP, POP, or Exchange ActiveSync) in the Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Log, evidenced by the "BAV2ROPC" user agent.
Legacy basic-authentication clients are translated by Entra ID into a Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) grant,
a single-factor flow that submits the user's password directly and bypasses interactive multi-factor authentication.
This is commonly abused during password spraying and account takeover.
[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/07/02"
integration = ["o365"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/07/02"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies a successful login by a user principal through a legacy authenticated client (such as Authenticated SMTP,
IMAP, POP, or Exchange ActiveSync) in the Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Log, evidenced by the "BAV2ROPC" user agent.
Legacy basic-authentication clients are translated by Entra ID into a Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) grant,
a single-factor flow that submits the user's password directly and bypasses interactive multi-factor authentication.
This is commonly abused during password spraying and account takeover.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-o365.audit-*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "M365 Identity OAuth ROPC Grant via Legacy Authentication Client"
note = """## Triage and analysis
### Investigating M365 Identity OAuth ROPC Grant via Legacy Authentication Client
The Resource Owner Password Credentials (ROPC) flow allows a client to obtain tokens by submitting a user's credentials directly, without interactive sign-in. Legacy authentication clients (Authenticated SMTP, IMAP, POP, Exchange ActiveSync) that use basic authentication are translated by Entra ID into ROPC grants, which are single-factor and bypass interactive MFA. Microsoft 365 records these logins in the Unified Audit Log as `UserLoggedIn` events with the `BAV2ROPC` user agent. Adversaries abuse this flow for password spraying and account takeover against accounts that lack MFA enforcement or fall outside legacy-authentication blocking.
This rule identifies a successful ROPC/legacy-client login for a user principal not seen performing this activity in the last 10 days. Because the Unified Audit Log is a separate pipeline from the Entra ID sign-in diagnostic stream, this rule provides coverage even when non-interactive sign-in logs are not forwarded to the SIEM.
### Possible investigation steps
- Review `o365.audit.UserId` to identify the account that authenticated and determine whether it is expected to use legacy authentication clients.
- Review `o365.audit.ApplicationId` and `o365.audit.Target.ID` to identify the targeted resource. `00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000` is Office 365 Exchange Online, the typical target of Authenticated SMTP.
- Confirm the client via `user_agent.original: "BAV2ROPC"`, which indicates a legacy basic-authentication client translated into a ROPC grant.
- Review `o365.audit.ClientIP` / `source.ip` and geolocation to determine whether the source is expected for this user. Correlate with known-malicious infrastructure or unusual ASNs.
- Pivot on `o365.audit.UserId` in Entra ID Sign-In Logs (`logs-azure.signinlogs-*`) to corroborate the login, and look for a preceding burst of failed authentications (password spraying) from the same source or against the same account.
- Review subsequent activity by the account (mailbox access, rule creation, mail forwarding, OAuth consent) for signs of post-compromise actions on objectives.
### False positive analysis
- Legitimate legacy applications, service accounts, or scripts that still rely on Authenticated SMTP or other basic-authentication clients may trigger this rule. Validate the account, source, and business purpose, and exclude confirmed benign service accounts.
- Multifunction devices, scan-to-email appliances, and monitoring tools that submit mail via Authenticated SMTP can generate this activity. These are typically stable in source IP and account and can be excluded once verified.
### Response and remediation
- If the login is confirmed malicious, disable the account, revoke active sessions and refresh tokens, and reset the password.
- Disable SMTP AUTH and other legacy authentication for the affected mailbox (`Set-CASMailbox -SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled $true`) and, where feasible, tenant-wide.
- Enforce a Conditional Access policy that requires MFA and blocks legacy authentication for the affected user and, ideally, all users.
- Investigate the source IP and any preceding failed-authentication activity to scope a potential password-spray campaign.
- Review the account's activity after the login (mailbox rules, forwarding, delegate changes, OAuth grants) and remediate any unauthorized changes.
"""
references = [
"https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/attackers-unleash-teamfiltration-account-takeover-campaign",
"https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-detection/bav2ropc/",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/v2-oauth-ropc",
"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/office/office-365-management-api/office-365-management-activity-api-schema",
"https://www.huntress.com/blog/lshiy-password-spray-attack",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "3d753eb2-68c4-404a-9279-91a3ad490765"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Cloud",
"Domain: Identity",
"Data Source: Microsoft 365",
"Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs",
"Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
"Tactic: Initial Access",
"Tactic: Defense Evasion",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "new_terms"
query = '''
data_stream.dataset: "o365.audit" and
event.code: "AzureActiveDirectoryStsLogon" and
event.action: "UserLoggedIn" and
user_agent.original: "BAV2ROPC" and
event.outcome: "success"
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1078"
name = "Valid Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1078.004"
name = "Cloud Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1078"
name = "Valid Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1078.004"
name = "Cloud Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[rule.new_terms]
field = "new_terms_fields"
value = ["o365.audit.UserId"]
[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
field = "history_window_start"
value = "now-7d"