New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner

ELASTIC detection rule by Elastic · Elastic License v2

This rule detects the creation of a self-hosted Github runner from a first time seen user.name in the last 5 days. Adversaries may abuse self-hosted runners to execute workflow jobs on customer infrastructure.

[metadata]
creation_date = "2025/11/28"
integration = ["github"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/04/10"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
This rule detects the creation of a self-hosted Github runner from a first time seen user.name in the last 5 days. Adversaries
may abuse self-hosted runners to execute workflow jobs on customer infrastructure.
"""
false_positives = [
    "Authorized self-hosted GitHub actions runner.",
]
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-github.audit-*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner"
note = """## Triage and analysis

### Investigating New GitHub Self Hosted Action Runner

Adversaries who gain the ability to modify or trigger workflows in a linked GitHub repository can execute arbitrary commands on the runner host.

### Possible investigation steps

- Validate the user is authoried to perform this change
- Review the purpose of the self-hosted action runner and what actions will be executed.
- Verify if there is any adjascent  sensitive file access or collection.
- Correlate with other alerts and investiguate if this activity is related to a supply chain attack.

### False positive analysis

- Authorized github self-hosted actions runner.

### Response and remediation

- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized command execution and potential lateral movement.
- Terminate any suspicious child processes that were initiated by the Github actions runner.
- Conduct a thorough review of the affected system's logs and configurations to identify any unauthorized changes or additional indicators of compromise.
- Restore the system from a known good backup if any unauthorized changes or malicious activities are confirmed.
- Implement application whitelisting to prevent unauthorized execution.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to assess the potential impact on the broader network."""
references = [
    "https://www.elastic.co/blog/shai-hulud-worm-npm-supply-chain-compromise",
    "https://socket.dev/blog/shai-hulud-strikes-again-v2",
    "https://www.wiz.io/blog/shai-hulud-2-0-ongoing-supply-chain-attack"
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "40c34c8a-b0bc-43bc-83aa-d2b76bf129e1"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
    "Domain: Cloud",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Initial Access",
    "Data Source: Github",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "new_terms"

query = '''
data_stream.dataset:"github.audit" and
    event.category:"configuration" and
    event.action: (
        "repo.register_self_hosted_runner" or
        "org.register_self_hosted_runner" or
        "enterprise.register_self_hosted_runner"
    )
'''

[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"

[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1195"
name = "Supply Chain Compromise"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1195.001"
name = "Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/001/"

[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1195.002"
name = "Compromise Software Supply Chain"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/002/"

[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0001"
name = "Initial Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/"
[rule.new_terms]
field = "new_terms_fields"
value = ["user.name", "github.actor_ip"]

[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
field = "history_window_start"
value = "now-5d"

[[ currentRule.title && currentRule.title.length > 60 ? currentRule.title.slice(0, 60) + '…' : currentRule.title ]]

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