AdminSDHolder SDProp Exclusion Added
ELASTIC detection rule by Elastic · Elastic License v2
Identifies a modification on the dsHeuristics attribute on the bit that holds the configuration of groups excluded from
the SDProp process. The SDProp compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the AdminSDHolder
object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, the permissions on the protected
accounts and groups are reset to match those of the domain's AdminSDHolder object, meaning that groups excluded will
remain unchanged. Attackers can abuse this misconfiguration to maintain long-term access to privileged accounts in these
groups.
[metadata]
creation_date = "2022/02/24"
integration = ["system", "windows"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2026/05/03"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies a modification on the dsHeuristics attribute on the bit that holds the configuration of groups excluded from
the SDProp process. The SDProp compares the permissions on protected objects with those defined on the AdminSDHolder
object. If the permissions on any of the protected accounts and groups do not match, the permissions on the protected
accounts and groups are reset to match those of the domain's AdminSDHolder object, meaning that groups excluded will
remain unchanged. Attackers can abuse this misconfiguration to maintain long-term access to privileged accounts in these
groups.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-system.security*", "logs-windows.forwarded*", "winlogbeat-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "AdminSDHolder SDProp Exclusion Added"
references = [
"https://www.cert.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/guide-ad.html#dsheuristics_bad",
"https://petri.com/active-directory-security-understanding-adminsdholder-object",
]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "61d29caf-6c15-4d1e-9ccb-7ad12ccc0bc7"
severity = "high"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Windows",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Persistence",
"Data Source: Active Directory",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
"Use Case: Active Directory Monitoring",
"Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
any where host.os.type == "windows" and event.code == "5136" and
winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName : "dSHeuristics" and
winlog.event_data.OperationType : "%%14674" and
length(winlog.event_data.AttributeValue) > 15 and
winlog.event_data.AttributeValue regex~ "[0-9]{15}([1-9a-f]).*"
'''
note = """## Triage and analysis
### Investigating AdminSDHolder SDProp Exclusion Added
#### Possible investigation steps
- What did the 5136 record do to the SDProp exclusion mask?
- Focus: `winlog.event_data.OperationType` and `winlog.event_data.AttributeValue`; decode position "1" = Account Operators, "2" = Server Operators, "4" = Print Operators, "8" = Backup Operators, with additive hex combinations.
- Implication: escalate when an added or replaced value leaves any operator group excluded from SDProp, especially multiple groups; lower concern only when paired 5136 records prove removal and rollback to 0. If the active mask is unproven, treat as unresolved.
- Did the change land on the forest configuration object controlling SDProp behavior?
- Focus: `winlog.event_data.ObjectDN`, `winlog.event_data.DSName`, and `host.name`.
- Implication: forest-impacting when `winlog.event_data.ObjectDN` is the Directory Service object under "CN=Windows NT,CN=Services,CN=Configuration" and the naming context is in scope; narrow only when `winlog.event_data.DSName` and `host.name` identify a lab or recovery forest.
- Which identity changed "dSHeuristics", and does it fit directory configuration work?
- Focus: `user.id`, `user.name`, `user.domain`, and `winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId`.
- Implication: suspicious when the writer is not a dedicated directory-configuration identity for the affected forest; reduce concern only when identity and object match confirmed hardening or recovery.
- What source session produced the directory change?
- Why: the 5136 event names the writer, but session origin separates console or jump-host administration from remote or alternate-credential use.
- Focus: on the domain controller, find 4624 events where `winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId` equals the 5136 `winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId`; read `source.ip`, `winlog.logon.type`, and `winlog.event_data.AuthenticationPackageName`. $investigate_0
- Hint: search 4648 by `winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId` when explicit-credential use would change the answer. $investigate_1
- Hint: Missing authentication telemetry is unresolved, not benign.
- Implication: escalate for unexpected workstation, direct DC logon, remote-interactive path, NTLM where Kerberos is expected, or explicit-credential use; reduce concern when origin, logon type, and authentication package fit the confirmed directory-configuration case.
- Did the same operation or session change other privileged directory state?
- Why: SDProp exclusion is most damaging with AdminSDHolder ACL, privileged membership, delegation, or security-descriptor changes that persist because SDProp no longer resets excluded groups.
- Focus: 5136 events on the same `host.id` where `winlog.event_data.OpCorrelationID` matches, then the same `winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId` if needed; read `winlog.event_data.ObjectDN`, `winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName`, and `winlog.event_data.AttributeValue`. $investigate_2
- Range: inspect the alert burst first; if the mask stayed non-zero, extend through the weakened interval for follow-on membership, ACL, delegation, or security-descriptor changes on excluded groups.
- Implication: escalate when the same burst touches AdminSDHolder, privileged groups, delegation attributes, or security descriptors; lower suspicion only when grouped changes stay limited to one intentional SDProp configuration action.
- If local evidence remains suspicious or unresolved, do related alerts change scope or urgency?
- Focus: recent alerts for the same `user.id`. $investigate_3
- Hint: also review domain controller `host.id` when controller compromise or change spread remains unresolved. $investigate_4
- Implication: broaden response when the writer or controller has related AD tampering, unusual authentication, privilege abuse, persistence, credential-access, or lateral-movement alerts; keep scope local only when related alerts are quiet and local telemetry supports a bounded explanation.
- Escalate for an active non-zero in-scope mask, abnormal writer or source session, or grouped privileged changes; close only when mask, operation, scope, writer, session, and grouped 5136 prove rollback to 0 or confirmed hardening/testing without contradictions; preserve and escalate mixed or incomplete cases.
### False positive analysis
- Treat non-zero SDProp exclusions as suspicious. Directory hardening or delegated-admin redesign is benign only when excluded operator groups were intentionally stripped of privileged rights and a dedicated configuration workflow made the change. Confirm `winlog.event_data.AttributeValue` maps to the planned group set, `winlog.event_data.ObjectDN` and `winlog.event_data.DSName` identify the expected Directory Service object, `user.id` and recovered `source.ip` identify the authorized admin session, and `winlog.event_data.OpCorrelationID` activity stays bounded to maintenance. If evidence is unavailable, the alert remains unresolved; do not close from repetition.
- Lab-forest or recovery-forest testing may intentionally change "dSHeuristics". Confirm `winlog.event_data.DSName` and `host.name` place the event in that forest, `user.id` and `winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId` identify the designated test administrator, and related alerts on `host.id` lack unrelated credential-access, persistence, or lateral-movement activity. If records are unavailable, treat as unresolved unless another reliable source confirms forest identity and administrator.
- Before creating an exception, validate recurrence for the same `user.id`, `host.id`, `winlog.event_data.ObjectDN`, `winlog.event_data.DSName`, `winlog.event_data.AttributeValue`, and bounded `winlog.event_data.OpCorrelationID` pattern. Avoid exceptions on "dSHeuristics", event 5136, or rule name alone.
### Response and remediation
- If confirmed benign, reverse temporary containment and document the mask, object scope, writer, session origin, controller, and confirmation source proving the authorized workflow. Keep exceptions tied to the recurring workflow pattern, not the attribute or event code.
- If suspicious but unconfirmed, preserve triggering and grouped 5136 records, linked 4624 or 4648 authentication records, and key identifiers: `winlog.event_data.ObjectGUID`, `winlog.event_data.OpCorrelationID`, `user.id`, `host.id`, and recovered `source.ip`. Apply reversible containment tied to those findings: restrict the implicated account from directory-configuration changes, increase DC monitoring, or contain the recovered source host if not a critical controller. Escalate to account disablement or host isolation only when related alerts or session evidence show broader abuse.
- If confirmed malicious, preserve directory-change and authentication evidence before changing configuration. Restore "dSHeuristics" to the expected value, verify rollback replication on other domain controllers, and review the same `winlog.event_data.OpCorrelationID` or `winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId` for unauthorized directory changes. Contain the writer account or recovered source host with identity or endpoint response tooling; avoid isolating a domain controller unless broader compromise is confirmed and directory owners can tolerate the action.
- After containment, check whether excluded operator groups received unauthorized membership, ACL, delegation, or security-descriptor changes while SDProp protection was weakened, and roll back only malicious changes identified.
- Post-incident hardening: keep Windows Security 5136 directory-service auditing enabled on domain controllers, restrict "dSHeuristics" changes to dedicated directory-configuration workflows, reduce or remove privileged rights from built-in operator groups where possible, and record visibility gaps or adjacent variants for engineering review.
"""
setup = """## Setup
Audit Directory Service Changes must be enabled to generate the events used by this rule.
Setup instructions: https://ela.st/audit-directory-service-changes
"""
[rule.investigation_fields]
field_names = [
"@timestamp",
"host.name",
"host.id",
"user.id",
"winlog.event_data.SubjectUserSid",
"winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId",
"winlog.event_data.ObjectDN",
"winlog.event_data.ObjectGUID",
"winlog.event_data.ObjectClass",
"winlog.event_data.AttributeLDAPDisplayName",
"winlog.event_data.AttributeValue",
"winlog.event_data.OperationType",
"winlog.event_data.OpCorrelationID",
"winlog.event_data.DSName",
]
[transform]
[[transform.investigate]]
label = "Linked logon for the modifying session"
description = ""
providers = [
[
{ excluded = false, field = "host.id", queryType = "phrase", value = "{{host.id}}", valueType = "string" },
{ excluded = false, field = "winlog.event_data.TargetLogonId", queryType = "phrase", value = "{{winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId}}", valueType = "string" },
{ excluded = false, field = "event.code", queryType = "phrase", value = "4624", valueType = "string" }
]
]
relativeFrom = "now-24h/h"
relativeTo = "now"
[[transform.investigate]]
label = "Explicit credential events for the modifying session"
description = ""
providers = [
[
{ excluded = false, field = "host.id", queryType = "phrase", value = "{{host.id}}", valueType = "string" },
{ excluded = false, field = "winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId", queryType = "phrase", value = "{{winlog.event_data.SubjectLogonId}}", valueType = "string" },
{ excluded = false, field = "event.code", queryType = "phrase", value = "4648", valueType = "string" }
]
]
relativeFrom = "now-24h/h"
relativeTo = "now"
[[transform.investigate]]
label = "All 5136 events in this SDProp exclusion change set"
description = ""
providers = [
[
{ excluded = false, field = "host.id", queryType = "phrase", value = "{{host.id}}", valueType = "string" },
{ excluded = false, field = "winlog.event_data.OpCorrelationID", queryType = "phrase", value = "{{winlog.event_data.OpCorrelationID}}", valueType = "string" },
{ excluded = false, field = "event.code", queryType = "phrase", value = "5136", valueType = "string" }
]
]
relativeFrom = "now-24h/h"
relativeTo = "now"
[[transform.investigate]]
label = "Alerts associated with the writer"
description = ""
providers = [
[
{ excluded = false, field = "event.kind", queryType = "phrase", value = "signal", valueType = "string" },
{ excluded = false, field = "user.id", queryType = "phrase", value = "{{user.id}}", valueType = "string" }
]
]
relativeFrom = "now-48h/h"
relativeTo = "now"
[[transform.investigate]]
label = "Alerts associated with the domain controller"
description = ""
providers = [
[
{ excluded = false, field = "event.kind", queryType = "phrase", value = "signal", valueType = "string" },
{ excluded = false, field = "host.id", queryType = "phrase", value = "{{host.id}}", valueType = "string" }
]
]
relativeFrom = "now-48h/h"
relativeTo = "now"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1078"
name = "Valid Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1078.002"
name = "Domain Accounts"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/002/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1098"
name = "Account Manipulation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1484"
name = "Domain or Tenant Policy Modification"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"