Living-off-the-Land Data Exfiltration

SIGMA detection rule by AgentShield · Apache-2.0

Detects legitimate tools repurposed for data exfiltration via alternative protocols. Covers git push to arbitrary HTTP remotes, SSH reverse/local/ dynamic tunnels, openssl encrypted channels, Python HTTP servers, and netcat listeners. These bypass curl/wget-focused exfiltration rules.

title: Living-off-the-Land Data Exfiltration
id: af74dcc8-c033-5847-a7c9-a3f6eb0ef3b4
related:
  - id: a14b9074-91c3-51f3-9a6b-d027e993c003
    type: similar
  - id: 74dee137-ffb8-54c8-862f-4a98a61f63ee
    type: similar
status: test
description: |
  Detects legitimate tools repurposed for data exfiltration via alternative
  protocols. Covers git push to arbitrary HTTP remotes, SSH reverse/local/
  dynamic tunnels, openssl encrypted channels, Python HTTP servers, and
  netcat listeners. These bypass curl/wget-focused exfiltration rules.
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048/
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/
  - https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.04783
author: AgentShield
date: "2026-02-26"
modified: "2026-02-26"
tags:
  - attack.exfiltration
  - attack.t1048
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1572
logsource:
  product: ai_agent
  category: agent_events
detection:
  selection_git_push_url:
    event_type: tool_call
    command|contains|all:
      - 'git push'
      - 'http'
  selection_git_remote_add:
    event_type: tool_call
    command|contains|all:
      - 'git remote add'
      - 'http'
  selection_ssh_tunnel_reverse:
    event_type: tool_call
    command|contains|all:
      - 'ssh'
      - '-R '
  selection_ssh_tunnel_local:
    event_type: tool_call
    command|contains|all:
      - 'ssh'
      - '-L '
  selection_ssh_tunnel_dynamic:
    event_type: tool_call
    command|contains|all:
      - 'ssh'
      - '-D '
  selection_openssl_connect:
    event_type: tool_call
    command|contains:
      - 'openssl s_client'
      - 'openssl s_server'
  selection_python_http_server:
    event_type: tool_call
    command|contains|all:
      - 'python'
      - 'http.server'
  selection_nc_listen:
    event_type: tool_call
    command|contains:
      - 'nc -l'
      - 'ncat -l'
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Developers using git push to legitimate HTTP remotes such as GitHub or GitLab
  - System administrators using SSH tunnels for authorised remote access to internal services
level: medium

[[ currentRule.title && currentRule.title.length > 60 ? currentRule.title.slice(0, 60) + '…' : currentRule.title ]]

8eb275a3-2157-4d23-96c4-c4e70350005d

Propose edits, view related rules, and engage with the community through comments.

Executable code, not a declarative rule

This submission is arbitrary [[ currentRule.format ? currentRule.format.toUpperCase() : '' ]] code, not a declarative detection rule — review it as you would any script before running it, and note that it cannot be safely aggregated or auto-executed alongside YARA/Sigma/Suricata/CRS rules.

Rejected pattern present

[[ reason ]]

What does this mean?

Format & documentation suggestions

Not a security issue — this rule is valid and was accepted as-is. These are optional fields/conventions its own format recommends, mainly affecting its quality score and how well it documents itself for other reviewers.

[[ reason ]]

What do these messages mean?

[[ currentRule.title && currentRule.title.length > 60 ? currentRule.title.slice(0, 60) + '…' : currentRule.title ]]

[[ currentRule.title ]]

Community Discussion